Monday 11 September 2017

I Refute It Thus!


Some theorists take the view that we have no direct perceptual access to the world. They argue that perception is mediated by our representational skills, creative techniques and—if they are to be consistent—the raw materials we use as well (although—tellingly—many would deny this latter condition). This doctrine is known as Transcendental Idealism and was first propounded by the German philosopher Emanuel Kant in the 18th Century. Idealism also comes in a vanilla edition which takes perception to be a creation of the mind or brain for the benefit of... well for the benefit of the mind or brain I guess. Many withering and sometimes funny attempts have been made to discredit Idealism, but its followers seem to be incurable. In contrast to both forms of Idealism, Realism—which also comes in various flavours—takes the world to be very largely as we find it.

The Realist philosopher Karl Popper claimed that Idealism (including Transcendental Idealism no doubt) and Realism are “neither demonstrable nor refutable”. Perhaps he was right. However, some would argue—with a tinge of irony—that his claim itself is not beyond refutation. One famous attempt at a refutation of Idealism was performed by Samuel Johnson, who kicked a neighbouring stone and quipped: “I refute it thus!” Most philosophers find his demonstration to be thoroughly unconvincing. Nonetheless, Johnson’s perfunctory gesture may have more to commend it than is ordinarily conceded or acknowledged.
Natural or manufactured objects, like the heart [or brain], chemical agents, the planets or engines, have an action, which may be slow, complicated or beautiful; but they do not take action, they do not act, however much they may act on other things. (Alan White "The Philosophy of Action", 1968 p.2)
Johnson had to take action to kick the rock; in order to make his demonstration. There is no such thing as a representation without some actions being taken to produce it. But a brain or mind cannot take action, least of all representational action. Brains are obviously significantly involved in the taking of actions but they do not have agency or take actions on their own or anyone else's behalf. The Idealist's claim that the mind/brain creates representations simply doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Even Transcendental Idealists reject Idealism as wholly incoherent.

When we act, our actions are comprised of countless unthinking physiological processes that have been shaped by millions of years of evolutionary development. Representation is merely a very recent cultural and fully public outgrowth from a winnowing process that has left countless behaviours and sensory failures in its wake. Life in general is a testament to the undeniable efficacy of mindless sensory responsiveness. It is this sensory integration, and not our representations or even our perceptions, that determines what we reliably take for granted.
“The thesis that ‘our representational practices determine all the divisions’ is vulnerable to the criticism that the de facto success of our representational practices can only be attributable to regularities that are implicit in the relationships between the components of the universe itself.” (Donald Brook, in personal correspondence 20/09/16)
Some people find Brook a little difficult to grasp, so perhaps I can try to put it differently. If the world were not comprised of objects and circumstances in precisely the configurations that we find them, then our representations, not to mention our biological processes, would never have gotten off the ground in the first place.

14 comments:

Philip Cartwright said...

Hi Jim,

A quick point about the Brook quote. The idea that the success of a practice shows its correctness is somewhat circular, for who decides what counts as "success"? Presumably the very same people who are saying the practice is correct!

Jim Hamlyn said...

Thanks Philip,

That’s interesting, although I doubt Brook would find it worrisome. I think he means “success’ in the sense that mitosis say, is regarded as a success on the part of all multicellular creatures. That’s the gist of what I was trying to get at when I rephrased Brook’s comment anyway.

Brook’s argument is a lot like Putnam’s “Miracle argument” I suppose. It really would be a miracle if it turns out that there are no exploitable regularities in the universe.

Paul Herman said...

Exploitable regularities? Aren't miracles, by definition, suspensions of natural law?

Jim Hamlyn said...

If there were any.

Ville Kansanen said...

Are you familiar with any of the current work in the field of neuroscience? Much of what we perceive is a feedback loop of ‘creating’ a scene and ‘receiving’ a scene. You imagine much of what you experience as ‘seeing’. The proportions vary depending on the activity. You peripheral vision is often largely imagined in accordance to pattern recognition for example. Straight lines are also imagined. In this sense, we don’t really see anything - we collaborate.

Jim Hamlyn said...

Hi Ville, Thanks for your comment. The conceptual foundations of any form of theorisation—scientific or otherwise— need to make sense, but it is obviously not science that determines what makes sense and what does not. Peter Hacker and Max Bennett’s book “The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience” is well worth reading in this respect.

Ville Kansanen said...

I’m not sure I share your conviction on such a clear line. Isn’t science the business of sense making? Perhaps I’m thinking about this in a more simplistic sense. I’ll add the book to my reading list!

Jim Hamlyn said...

Scientific theories have to make sense, but it Isn’t science that determines this sense. That would be plainly circular.

Also, if science were the business of sense making, then prior to the emergence of science (which most people agree is a relatively recent set of developments) there could have been no sense.

Hacker and Bennett have written several books together in the subject of philosophy and neuroscience. TPFoN is the most comprehensive though.

Ville Kansanen said...

Ah yes, I see what you’re saying. I didn’t mean to assert that science is the only way to make sense of the world and before it nothing made sense. That seems like a bit of a leap. If you mean that making sense of the nature of reality is not largely a scientific pursuit, I’ll have to disagree with you, as it is at least some form of defense against the myriad of intuitive errors we make when trying to make sense of information. If you mean formulating what the sense is worth, then I agree that is not in the domain of science. We made some awful sense of the world before science came along.

Ville Kansanen said...

I recently received the book. The very intro states:”Investigating logical relations among concepts is a philosophical task. Guiding that investigation down pathways that will illuminate brain research is a neuroscientific one.” If this is what you mean, then we agree and I’m talking past you.

Jim Hamlyn said...

Yes, it’s impotant to recognise that the results of scientific experiments do not always have to make sense, whereas our statements do. When scientific experiments do not make sense, we often need to modify our theories. Whereas when statements do not make sense, we usually need to offer further clarification or to start again.

I’m really pleased that you got yourself a copy of Hacker and Bennett’s book. I hope you find it as enlightening as I have.

Ville Kansanen said...

That’s an excellent summary. I don’t think I’ve really been able to parse that together clearly before. Im excited to read the book. However, looks like the studies in the book are a little dated. Have you read any VS Ramachandran or Antonio Damasio? Highly recommend both. Damasio is more detailed but not the best of writers. My original point was only that the visual system has proven to be quite subjective and to pair that with the fact that at a sub-atomic level the perceivable/measurable world is incoherent to us. That to me opens the door to thinking about the possibilities of idealism, or at least the concept that we live within the same margins of an expression of reality, rather than reality itself.

Jim Hamlyn said...

Yes, I have books by both Damasio and Ramachandran. Hacker and Bennett cite both of them at various points and expose several conceptual confusions. They have both made important contributions to science of course but I find myself in complete agreement with the criticisms made by H&B.

Ville Kansanen said...

I shall have to read it before I pester you again then.

Post a Comment